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Abstract 
This paper establishes a model of likely campaign effectiveness, before 
examining the intensity of constituency campaigning at the 2010 General 
Election in Britain and its subsequent impact on electoral outcomes, using both 
aggregate and individual level data. It shows that constituency campaigning 
yielded benefits in varying degrees for all three main parties and that Labour’s 
constituency campaign efforts were effective despite the electoral context, and 
ultimately affected the overall outcome of the election. These findings have 
significant implications for our understanding of the circumstances under which 
campaigns are likely to be more or less effective, and provide further evidence 
that a carefully managed campaign stands the most chance of delivering tangible 
electoral payoffs. 
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1. Introduction - The growing importance and potential for campaign effects 
In studies of the past few elections, a broad consensus has developed to suggest that 
election campaigning may be electorally effective in Britain (Clarke et al, 2004, 2009; 
Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Pattie, et al., 1995; Denver et al., 2003). Indeed, there are several 
contextual effects that heighten the potential for campaign payoffs. First, the strength of 
partisan identification in Britain has declined in intensity, and to a lesser extent in overall 
volume though the core of fairly strong partisans has remained relatively constant (see 
Figure 1). Secondly, voter hesitancy has increased (see Figure 2). In 2010, fully 37% of 
respondents to the British Election Study post-election survey indicated that they had made 
their decision on how to vote during the campaign, with a further 13% indicating that their 
decision had been taken since the turn of the year. Given that all parties engage in ‘long-
term’ campaigning – especially in target seats (Fisher & Denver, 2008) – there would appear 
to be significant potential at least for constituency campaigning to be electorally significant. 
Thirdly, while voters may indeed make electoral judgements ostensibly exogenous to 
campaigning, long-term party campaigning could theoretically act to some degree as a 
preference shaper of voter judgements, which, as Clarke et al (2011) show, have become 
increasingly important in voters’ choices. 
 
                                               
1  Research for this paper was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. Grant Number RES-000-22-
2762. This support is gratefully acknowledged 
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Some sceptics, however, point out that few voters change their minds as a result of 
campaigns. Rather, reinforcement is the most likely outcome. Consequently, it is argued that 
this may suggest the relative unimportance of campaigns (see, for example, Holbrook, 1996: 
613). This argument however, is flawed for two reasons. First the mobilisation of supporters 
by a party to turn out to vote can make a large impact on their vote share. Second, although 
counter-factual and not observable, failure to campaign might result in loss of votes for a 
party. The observed change in party support hides the impact on those who were persuaded 
to stick with their party of choice. Thus the down-playing of reinforcement makes no logical 
sense: vote switching may be easier to measure, but the cementing of voter choice is just as 
significant. 
 
Beyond these broader contextual factors the importance and potential electoral impact of 
campaigning is now widely accepted at the constituency level. Three different research 
teams have repeatedly demonstrated the electoral benefits that can accrue from well-
organised and intense election campaigns at constituency level in Britain, despite using 
different methodological approaches and measures of campaign strength (see, for example 
Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Pattie, et al., 1995; Denver et al., 2003). Moreover, work combining 
the different methods of measurement of campaign effort, has shown that all three major 
parties directed their resources to target and more marginal seats in the 2005 election, and 
this additional effort was rewarded both in boosting the party’s vote and reducing its 
opponent’s vote (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008).  
 
1.1 In this paper we seek to measure the electoral impact of the three main British 
parties’ campaigns at the 2010 election (Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats). 
Aggregate data are drawn from a survey of all electoral agents of the five major parties in 
Great Britain - the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party (N=1,993).2 1,079 valid responses were received – an overall response rate 
of 54%. Details of responses by party are shown in the Appendix. These illustrate a 
representative spread of constituencies. In order to confirm this, however, means were 
compared in respect of candidate spending (percentage of maximum spent) during the 
regulated long and short campaigns. For all parties, the results indicate that our sample is 
robust (see Appendix). In addition, in depth interviews were conducted with the parties at 
national level, as well as with agents in constituencies selected on the basis of their electoral 
status. We also use individual level data from the British Election Study’s Campaign Internet 
Panel Survey to confirm the patterns observed in our aggregate level data. 
                                               
2
  As is customary, no candidates from the major parties (in this case, Labour and the Liberal Democrats) contested the 
seat of the Speaker. 
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Figure 1.  Partisan Identification 1964-2010 
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Figure 2. Late Deciders 1964-2010 
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2. The Electoral Context 
Notwithstanding these more general observations, previous research on the impact of 
constituency campaigns has demonstrated how the extent the electoral impact will vary by 
electoral context. Broadly speaking, three patterns emerge. First, the competitiveness of an 
election will have a bearing on the level of electoral impact – tight elections (such as the 
British election of 1992) will generally lead to stronger electoral campaigns and a greater 
impact of those campaigns. Second, elections where significant change is anticipated – 
maybe even critical elections (such as the British election of 1997) - are likely to produce 
more effective campaigns – particularly for the principal challenger. Thirdly, successful 
constituency campaigns are partly a function of good central coordination (Fisher et al., 
2006a). Coordination is better achieved when there are fewer target seats, and so 
campaigns will tend to be more effective when there are fewer seats to target. For example, 
in the 2001 election, both Labour and the Conservatives’ campaigns were generally less 
effective, in part because they were targeting so many seats (Denver et al., 2002a).  
 
In addition to these factors, campaigns will also be affected in part by the ‘national mood’. 
We would expect that campaigns are likely to be less effective when a party is unpopular 
and on the defensive, thereby creating conditions where voters are less receptive to a 
party’s campaign. An example of this is 2005, when Labour campaigning, despite being well 
organised, had significantly less impact compared with previous elections (Fisher et al., 
2005). Other research using experimental methods has also shown that campaign 
interventions are affected by the level of popularity of the party (Niven, 2001; Hillygus, 2005; 
Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). In other words (and not surprisingly) overall party 
popularity in the run-up to an election may matter to campaign effectiveness.  
 
Overall, the effectiveness of campaigns for all parties should be stronger when the parties 
are reasonably popular. We refer to this as popularity equilibrium. In other words, parties 
may not be equally popular (else the election could theoretically result in a tie) but that no 
parties are especially unpopular – there is, in effect, a normal state of affairs in terms of the 
relative popularity of the parties. Under the conditions of popularity equilibrium, targeting a 
large number of seats is likely to lead to less effective campaigning. However, where one or 
more parties are very unpopular, the effects of targeting a large numbers of seats may be 
partially reversed for the more popular party. Equally, a tight election (bearing in mind that 
electoral outcomes are a function of changes in seat shares, which may not closely reflect 
aggregate votes shares) should generate equally effective campaigning under the conditions 
of popularity equilibrium, but not where one or more parties is relatively unpopular. We can 
summarize these expected outcomes in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Exogenous factors influencing likely effectiveness of constituency campaigns 
   
 More Effective Less Effective 
Closeness of Election Popularity Equilibrium Unpopular party(ies) 
Significant change likely Challenger(s)   Incumbent  
High No’s of Target seats Unpopular party(ies) Popularity Equilibrium 
 
The 2010 election was one where all of these ostensibly exogenous factors were important 
to some extent. First, the election was increasingly tight. The Conservatives’ 17-point poll 
lead in previous September 2009 had been significantly reduced on the back of increasing 
economic optimism and a growing view that the incumbent party had handled the economic 
crisis well, coupled with concerns about the likely impact of significant cuts in the event of a 
Conservative victory (Clarke et al, 2011). By the time the election was called in early April 
2010, the Conservative lead was around 8-9 points. Coupled with that, the poll rating of the 
Liberal Democrats increased significantly at particular points during the short campaign 
(though it also fell back as polling day approached). Together with the effects of the electoral 
system (which have tended to favour Labour in recent elections), the outcome of the election 
remained unclear during much of the campaign. Second, it was evident nevertheless that 
some significant change was on the horizon. At the very least, it was plain that thirteen years 
of Labour majority rule were coming to an end. Beyond that, there were a number of 
possibilities, including either a Conservative minority or majority administration (few 
predicted a coalition). For those reasons, we might have expected constituency campaigning 
to be more effective for the challengers 
 
On the other hand, the electoral arithmetic suggested that parties’ powers of coordination 
would be stretched. The Conservatives needed to win 116 seats just to gain a majority of 
one. This would have represented the third largest number of gains in the post-war period, 
bettered only by the landslide victories of 1945 and 1997 (the next largest number of gains 
was 67 in 1970). The Liberal Democrats too had many more seats to target. In the first 
instance, there was the large number of their own seats to defend. Unfortunately for the 
Liberal Democrats, few can normally be regarded as being truly ‘safe’ – particularly with a 
resurgent Conservative Party. Second, the Liberal Democrats’ success in winning some 
seats from Labour in 2005 meant that there were opportunities to increase their number of 
seats further, particularly with Labour being relatively unpopular. In addition, Labour found 
itself seeking to defend seats from a number of parties in order to minimise its losses. 
Labour knew it would lose seats. The key issue was ensuring that it did not lose too many. 
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All in all, this meant that all parties were potentially stretched in terms of effectively 
coordinating their efforts at constituency level. 
 
Overall, these factors would have suggested the following in terms of the likely effectiveness 
of their constituency campaigns: the Conservatives had advantages under all three 
conditions of the election’s closeness, the likelihood of change and the number of targets. In 
all three, the relative unpopularity of Labour made conditions more favourable for the 
Conservatives. However, while Labour was unpopular, the Conservatives were not 
themselves overwhelming popular, thus tempering their advantage. Labour’s unpopularity 
meant that it was at a disadvantage across all three exogenous factors. Finally, the Liberal 
Democrats had distinct advantages. The party was relatively popular and despite targeting 
relatively large numbers of seats, was advantaged by Labour’s unpopularity and the 
Conservatives’ less robust standing. 
 
3. Target Seats and Targeting Strategies 
All three parties, as would be expected, had target seats and specific targeting strategies. 
What has emerged, however, over recent elections is not so much a binary measure of 
whether or not a seat is a target, but particular categories of target seat status. There is an 
overall group of seats which are identified as targets, but the emphasis placed upon different 
sub-groups may not be identical – at least at central party level from where much direct mail 
is distributed (Fisher et al, 2011). Each of the three main parties identified a large number of 
seats to target, but within that group of seats there were divisions – very much like a football 
league – and the intention was that in seats within certain key divisions there would be more 
intense campaigning. 
 
Positioning within these divisions was not entirely fixed – depending on political and electoral 
circumstances, some seats were moved in or out of the core groups (Fisher et al, 2011). For 
example, following the Liberal Democrat boost and Labour’s decline in the opinion polls 
following the leaders’ debates (Pattie & Johnston, 2011), the Conservatives sought to switch 
their efforts from Liberal Democrat marginals to those seats where the party now thought it 
could more realistically challenge Labour. Of course, a shift in emphasis mid-campaign may 
be easier to accomplish in terms of the distribution of direct mail and telephone voter 
identification at a national level (Fisher, 2010). At local level, such a shift in emphasis will be 
more difficult to accomplish quickly.  
 
The Conservatives identified around 160 seats within four divisions. The ‘premier league’ 
consisted of 38 seats, and were ones the party expected to gain without significant effort. 
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These were described as ‘certainties’ More important were the first and second divisions 
(‘core targets’ and ‘possibles’) – seats the party would need to focus upon if it was to have 
any chance of power. The third division (‘hopefuls’) consisted of seats that were within the 
party’s range, but which the party would only be likely to win if the electoral picture was 
going very well. Labour had 145 targets overall. It, too, had four divisions of seats devised on 
a sophisticated basis according to electoral circumstances as well as levels of party activity 
(Fisher et al, 2011). Not surprisingly, the seats were almost always ones that the party was 
defending with differing expectations as to the likelihood of success. The Liberal Democrats 
had a comparatively large number of target seats, including all their own seats plus a further 
37 (mainly Labour-held) seats that the party hoped to gain: 99 in total. Thus, there were two 
divisions – defensive and offensive.  
 
4. Overall Campaign Intensity 
 Overall campaign intensity is best illustrated by the creation of an index, which incorporates 
all of the core components of a constituency campaign: preparation, organisation, 
manpower, use of computers, use of telephones, polling day activity, use of direct mail, level 
of doorstep canvassing, and leafleting (see, for example, Denver & Hands, 1997),. In this 
paper, we initially utilize two scales. First, the scale developed first in the 2001 study of 
constituency campaigning, which provides a good, comprehensive picture of campaign 
intensity (the 2001 scale). Second, we develop a new scale, which incorporates new 
measures first utilized in the 2010 study, which capture developments in e-campaigning (see 
Fisher et al, 2011). The intensity indexes are calculated using a Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) of all these core indicators of constituency campaigning.3 Using conventional 
cut-off criteria, the PCAs suggest one factor is sufficient to represent the variance in the 
original variables in both of the indexes (details of which are shown in the Appendix). The 
PCAs produce factor scores which are then standardised around a mean of 100. This 
process allows easy comparisons between parties as well as the target status of seats. The 
difference between the scores incorporating e-campaigning and those that do not are 
marginal. For information, we list both scores here, but the subsequent multi-variate 
analyses are conducted using the broader 2010 index (which includes e-campaigning).4  
 
4.1 The first step is to evaluate the distribution of campaign intensity by party and by 
target status. There are three categories: Targets (seats which a party is seeking to gain or 
defending, often with a small majority), Held Not Target (seats that party holds comfortably), 
                                               
3
 Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple imputation was 
used, which took account of the individual party and the target status of the seat. 
4
  The Campaign Intensity scales were calculated using responses from all five parties in the survey. However, only the 
scores for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats are shown in this paper. 
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and Not Held Not Target (seats in which the party has very little chance of winning). Parties 
that fail to target their resources effectively are less likely to generate positive electoral 
payoffs overall. Thus, we would expect parties as far as possible to distribute their resources 
such that target seats should have the most intense campaigns and ‘hopeless’ seats, the 
least intense. By and large, we would also expect seats that parties hold, but which are not 
targets to score somewhere in between, in part because safe seats tend to have higher 
levels of membership or local resources (Fisher, 2000; Fisher et al., 2006b).  
 
Table 2 illustrates the mean campaign index scores for each party overall and then by seat 
status. First, it is clear that the Conservatives had the strongest campaigns overall, with the 
Liberal Democrats having the weakest of the three largest parties. However, overall strength 
only tells part of the story. What is more important is that the strongest campaigns take place 
in the target seats. As Fisher and Denver (2008) have shown for example, while the Liberal 
Democrats have always been much weaker overall, they have been very successful in 
fighting their strongest campaigns where they were needed most, and therefore moving to a 
level of campaign development that is on a par with that of the Conservatives, despite the 
significant disparity in overall resources (see also Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008). Table 2 
illustrates that the Liberal Democrats were again successful in this respect, the intensity of 
the campaigns in their target seats being slightly higher than that of Labour and equal to that 
of the Conservatives. Nevertheless, this represents something of a change for the 
Conservatives, who have historically struggled to focus their efforts effectively. Indeed, 
perhaps the principal surprise is the relative strength of Conservative campaigning in its 
hopeless seats (Not Held, Not Target) – possibly reflecting the enthusiasm of Conservative 
supporters in an election where the party had a realistic chance of overall victory. Elsewhere, 
the results are pretty much as expected for the other parties (with the means for all 
categories being statistically significant from each other). 
 
 
Table 2. Campaign Intensity by Party and Target Status (2001 Scale in Parenthesis) 
 All Held Not 
Target 
Target Not Held Not 
Target 
Conservative 112 (112) 118 (119) 140 (140) 92 (91) 
Labour  100 (100) 116 (117) 131 (132) 76 (76) 
Liberal Democrat 91 (90) * 140 (140) 82 (82) 
 
 
4.2 Given that the parties had divisions of target seats, however, it is also interesting to 
see if the distribution of campaign effort varied in more detail. For each of the main parties, 
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we compare the mean distribution on campaign intensity across the various internally 
determined categories of seats. The differences in the means are not statistically significant 
(though they are compared with non-targets). They do, however, provide suggestive 
evidence of some differentiation in terms of campaign effort. Figure 3 examines 
Conservative seats, and the distribution is almost exactly as one might predict. The level of 
campaign intensity in the ‘certainties’ or the ‘premier league’ was higher than in non-targets, 
but not as high as in the ‘core targets’ (or division one). In the next set of targets, 
campaigning is a little lower than the certainties, while the long shots or ‘hopefuls’ had the 
least intense campaigns among the target seats. If we examine Labour (Figure 4), we 
observe a significant difference between targets and non-targets, and a progressive increase 
in intensity from the most vulnerable seats to the more defendable (up to the penultimate 
category) – suggesting a very defensive strategy by Labour. In the case of the Liberal 
Democrats (Figure 5), the difference between targets and non-targets is very clear. 
However, what is slightly surprising is that the intensity of campaigning was almost identical 
in Liberal Democrat seats as it was in its offensive targets (seats that the party hoped to 
gain). All in all, these figures suggest that there was some variation at constituency level in 
the intensity of campaigning in different target seats, but not as much as might have been 
predicted at national level, suggesting that such variation is difficult to manage with as much 
precision at local level. 
 
Figure 3. Conservative Campaign by Detailed Target Status 
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Figure 4. Labour Campaign by Detailed Target Status 
 
 
Figure 5. Liberal Democrat Campaign by Detailed Target Status 
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of the main three parties using ordinary least squares regression (OLS). On account of 
extensive boundary revisions in England and Wales, we are unable to estimate impact on 
the preferred dependent variable of share of the electorate as no robust data on ‘notional 
electorates’ for 2005 are available. Instead, share of the vote is used. The model we employ 
is straightforward. Each party’s share of the vote in 2010 is regressed on the campaign 
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makes the model a dynamic test and also ensures that other variables that are correlated 
with previous vote, such as demographics, are effectively controlled. In addition, previous 
vote share will also capture previous campaign efforts. Thus, insofar as campaign efforts are 
correlated over time, the true extent of campaign effects may actually be under-estimated. 
The test is a stiff one – not surprisingly, previous vote share captures a great deal of the 
variance, so the model provides a robust first test of whether or not constituency 
campaigning made a positive and significant contribution to vote shares at this election. 
 
For each party, it is apparent that more intense constituency campaigning did indeed appear 
to yield electoral payoffs, though the impact varies a little, with Liberal Democrat 
campaigning having the greatest impact. For example, the model suggests that a Liberal 
Democrat candidate (non-incumbent) whose campaign reached the average intensity of a 
Liberal Democrat target seat (140 from Table 2) could expect to win 35.4% of the vote 
compared to a similar candidate with a campaign intensity of a non-target seat (82) who 
would win 31.7% of the vote. The difference of 3.7% suggests a reasonable boost in vote for 
those Liberal Democrat candidates running a strong campaign. The equivalent figures for 
the Conservatives are 39.1% (campaign intensity 140) and 38.3% (campaign intensity 92) 
suggesting a difference of less than one percent.  These results represent both change and 
continuity with previous studies of constituency campaigning (Denver & Hands, 1997; 
Denver et al, 2002a, 2003; Fisher et al, 2005). In respect of the Liberal Democrats, there is 
continuity. The party’s seemingly effective targeting policy once again meant that local 
campaigns did yield tangible payoffs in addition to the positive effects of personal 
incumbency. In the case of the Conservatives, while its campaigning effects were the 
weakest of the three main parties, there is further evidence that the party has continued to 
improve in the way it conducts constituency campaigning such that it is now seemingly 
electorally effective. In previous elections, the party has periodically suffered from the fact 
that while it was running strong campaigns overall, the resources in campaigns were often 
insufficiently well focussed upon where they were required most.  
 
Labour’s result is, however, perhaps the most surprising. Given the importance of electoral 
context, we would have expected that Labour campaigning would be less effective, given 
that there was a widespread expectation that the party would lose majority rule, that it was 
required to target so many seats, and that it was unpopular and on the defensive. However, 
the results here suggest that faced with defeat and the prospect of a Conservative 
government or even losing second place to the Liberal Democrats, local Labour campaigns 
proved to be more effective than might have been imagined. Despite controlling for vote 
share in 2005 and some fairly substantial personal incumbency effects, Labour’s 
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constituency campaigning still yielded electoral payoffs. A Labour candidate (non-incumbent) 
whose campaign reached the average intensity of a Labour target seat (131) could expect to 
win 1.65% more of the vote share than a candidate with a campaign intensity of a non-target 
seat (intensity 76). 
 
Table 3. The Impact of Constituency Campaigning on Share of the Vote 2010 
 Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
Constant 2.290 (.705) ** -6.728 (.920) ** 1.231 (.701)   
Vote Share 2005 .987 (.020) ** .896 (.023) ** .723 (.032) ** 
Incumbent  .866 (.557) 2.706 (.699) ** 3.078 (.991) ** 
Campaign Intensity .016 (.007) * .030 (.010) ** .064 (.009) ** 
Adj. R
2
 .955  .901  .861 
 
Note 1: Coefficients are unstandardised b values. Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: ** p<.01 * p< .05  
 
5.2 The results in Table 3, however, only tell us so much since of course, campaigns do 
not occur in isolation – other parties are also campaigning in constituencies and thus the 
optimal outcome of any one party’s campaign is not only to enhance its share of the vote, 
but also to damage that of other parties. A further analysis is therefore required, which 
includes constituencies where we have campaign intensity scores for all three parties. 
Inevitably, this results in a reduction in the number of available cases and so it is here, 
where we have 102 constituencies with full scores for the Conservatives, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats.  
 
The application of OLS is, however, not necessarily appropriate for the analysis of vote 
shares in multi-party elections for three main reasons (Cutts and Shryane, 2006; Cutts and 
Webber, 2010). First, vote shares between two parties are negatively correlated - yet OLS 
models lack an appreciation of these substitution effects. Second, and related to the first 
reason, an assumption of OLS is that the residuals of separate models are uncorrelated. The 
residuals would be positively correlated because in constituencies where party vote share is 
higher than predicted by the model at least one of the other parties must be weaker than 
predicted, leading to large residual variances in both equations (Cutts and Shryane, 2006; 
Cutts et al, 2007). Using an OLS approach would ignore this correlation and could produce 
inefficient estimates. Thirdly, a party’s vote share is bounded between 0 and 100 per cent. 
OLS predictions, however, are unbounded and are based on continuous data which follow 
normal distributions. Consequently, using OLS models it is possible to generate vote share 
estimates that are either negative or greater than 100 per cent.  
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To combat the potential problems of using OLS regressions when analysing multi-party vote 
shares, a number of scholars have proposed using a method that is based upon the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) modelling technique (Katz and King, 1999; Tomz et 
al, 2002; Cutts and Shryane, 2006). To deal with the problem of unbounded predicted 
values, party vote shares are converted into vote share ratios using a logistic transformation. 
After the selection of a party as the reference category the natural log of the vote share ratio 
between it and other parties is obtained, thereby mapping bounded vote share values (i.e. 
0–100 percent) onto an unbounded (-∞ to +∞) vote share ratio measure. Non-independence 
is therefore dealt with in SUR by specifying equations (one for each of the dependent 
variables) to be jointly modelled and allowing the error terms to be correlated across 
equations (Cutts and Shryane, 2006). The selection of the party base category enables 
differences in vote shares between that party and another party to be analysed. For 
example, in Table 4 below where Labour and Liberal Democrat vote share is the base 
category, the equation can be written as follows: 
 
ln(Coni /Labi) = Xβi1 + εi1 
 
ln(LibDemi /Labi) = Xβi2 + εi2        (1) 
 
ln(Coni /LibDemi) = Xβi1 + εi1         
 
ln(Labi /LibDemi) = Xβi2 + εi2        (2) 
 
where   is the residuals for each constituency that are correlated across equations (e.g. εi1 
and εi2 within the equation), X  is a set of independent explanatory variables and   is a set 
of coefficients to be estimated. The equations (1-2) stated above do not include where the 
Conservatives are the base category and this would be needed for a comprehensive 
estimation.5 However for ease of interpretation, we provide the results where Labour is the 
base category and include the Conservative-Liberal Democrat comparison where the latter is 
the reference to show the differences in vote shares between all the main parties.6 
                                               
5
  Theoretically, there appears to be an inverted duplication in the dependent variables with, for example, ln(LDi /Labi) 
and ln(Labi/LDi). However, such an assertion is incorrect as the estimation of these two dependent variables is based 
on the simultaneous estimation of two other different dependent variables. As the errors will be correlated in different 
ways then the coefficients will be different too. Nevertheless, the quantitative estimates of explanatory variable 
coefficients for seemingly identical dependent variables will be highly correlated and similar in magnitude. But 
empirically, they will not necessarily be the same.  
6
  In Table 4, we provide the vote share differences between the main parties and not the results from the full set of 
base categories necessary for comprehensive estimation. However, the full results of the SUR model where 1) the 
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Table 4 (Model 1 and 2) shows the SUR model of where Labour is the reference category 
and the natural log of the vote share ratio between it and the other two parties as the 
dependent variables. Negative coefficients indicate an increase in Labour support compared 
with the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats because Labour vote share is the 
denominator in the ratio-dependent variable. Here we show the results of two models – with 
and without party support in the previous election. In both models, we ran the Breusch-
Pagan test to assess whether the residuals were uncorrelated across equations. The highly 
significant results indicate the violation of OLS assumptions and the justification for using the 
SUR approach.  
  
In Models 1 and 2, Labour campaigning, as measured through the campaign intensity index, 
had a significant impact and improved the Labour vote against both that of the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives. Liberal Democrat campaigning was effective in improving 
its relative vote share against Labour, while Conservative campaigning had no significant 
impact on its performance when compared against Labour once previous vote share is 
controlled for. Personal incumbency again mattered for Labour. Where the Labour candidate 
was an incumbent the party significantly improved its vote against both rival parties even 
after controlling for previous support. No such personal incumbency effects were evident for 
the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats against Labour when previous support was 
included in the model.  
 
Table 4 (Model 3) shows the SUR model of where the Liberal Democrats is the reference 
category. Liberal Democrat campaigning, as measured through the campaign intensity 
index, had a significant impact and improved the Liberal Democrat vote against the 
Conservatives, while Conservative campaigning had no significant impact on its 
performance relative to the Liberal Democrats when previous vote share is included. Labour 
campaigning did have a negative impact on the Liberal Democrat vote suggesting that 
Labour campaign intensity improved the Conservative vote at the expense of the Liberal 
Democrats. Where the Conservatives stood the same candidate as in the previous election, 
their vote significantly improved when compared against the Liberal Democrats. Personal 
incumbency effects were not evident for the Liberal Democrats or Labour.  
 
There is one caveat to these multi-party results. By necessity, we can only use cases where 
we have responses for all three parties. Perhaps inevitably, the distribution of those cases is 
                                                                                                                                                  
Liberal Democrats are the base category against Labour; 2) the Conservatives are the base category against Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats; 3) Other parties are the base categories is available from the authors on request.  
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not as representative as where we are only using data from only one party. Thus, in our 102 
cases that we are able to use for the SUR modelling, there is an over-representation of safer 
seats. Given that the Conservatives were on the offensive and Labour was on the defensive, 
there is a possibility therefore that our SUR results may overestimate the impact of Labour 
campaigns and underestimate that of the Conservatives. That said, the single party analyses 
and the individual-level analyses (see section 5.3) produce similar patterns to the SUR 
results, suggesting that whatever the limitations of the distribution of our case in the SUR 
analyses, that the broad findings are still robust. 
 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the results from previous studies (Denver & 
Hands, 1997; Denver et al, 2002a, 2003; Fisher et al, 2005). Labour and Liberal Democrat 
campaigning at constituency level tends to be more effective than that of the Conservatives. 
However, what is particularly noteworthy are the results for Labour. Once again, what 
emerges from these data is that Labour campaigns were successful against the odds and it 
is thanks to them in part that Labour’s losses were not nearly as great as might have been 
expected. All of this begs the question as to why electoral context did not appear to 
necessarily exert influence in ways that might be expected. The election was tight and 
change was expected, yet it was Labour and the Liberal Democrats whose campaigns were 
most effective, with Labour’s campaigning being effective despite its defensive stance and 
relative unpopularity.  
 
Table 4: SUR Model of Party Support in the 2010 General Election  
 
Variables Model 1 
Lab-LD 
Model 1 
Lab-Con 
Model 2 
Lab-LD 
Model 2 
Lab-Con 
Model 3 
LD-Con 
Model 3 
LD-Con 
Constant -.273  .262  .456 * .580 * .535 * .015  
Conservative Campaign  Intensity .003  .008 * .002  .001  .005 * -.000  
Labour Campaign Intensity -.011 * -.010 * -.007 * -.003 * .001  .003 * 
Lib Dem Campaign  Intensity .009 * .002  .003 * -.000  -.007 * -.002 * 
Conservative Incumbent .539 * .716 * .108  .108  .177 * .114 * 
Labour Incumbent -.408 * -.790 * -.232 * -.152 * -.382 * -.022  
Lib Dem Incumbent .757 * .084  -.173  -.090  -.673 * .191  
Lab-LD 2005 Vote Ratio -  -  .755 * -  -  -  
Lab-Con 2005 Vote Ratio -  -  -  .953 * -  -  
LD-Con 2005 Vote Ratio -  -  -  -  -  .824 * 
R
2
 .76 .70 .90 .96 .54 .83 
RMSEA .466 .573 .303 .217 .340 .211 
Number of Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
* Significant 5% level 
 
Model 1: Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence: chi2(1) = 65.995, Pr = 0.0000 
Model 2: Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence: chi2(1) =  45.391, Pr = 0.0000 
Model 3: Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence: chi2(1) = 25.982, Pr = 0.0000 
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5.3 Individual Level Analysis 
So why was Labour so apparently successful in terms of its constituency campaigning? One 
explanation is that Labour was successful in persuading ‘late deciders’ to vote for the party. 
We test this proposition using the British Election Campaign study, examining the ultimate 
vote choices made by respondents who initially declared themselves to be undecided in 
terms of which party to support in the pre-campaign survey, conducted just before the 
beginning of the campaign ‘proper’ at the end of March/beginning of April 2010. We then 
examine whether they were contacted by the parties and if so, in how many different ways 
they were contacted by each party over the course of the campaign. The British Election 
Study featured questions about eight different forms of party contact both during and 
immediately before the campaign (doorstep, telephone, in the street, leaflets, email, text, 
Twitter/Facebook or other). A scale was constructed of all these items for party to capture 
campaign intensity – more forms of contact being a surrogate for more intense campaigning. 
Of course, some of these forms of contact could include contacts from the national party 
rather than as a result of local efforts (especially leaflets or telephone calls), and voters 
would be unable to distinguish between the source of such contacts (local and national). 
However, given that we know that local and national campaigns are themselves increasingly 
integrated (Fisher & Denver, 2008), these individual data still therefore provide us with the 
opportunity to confirm the patterns found in our aggregate data which focus exclusively on 
local effort.   
 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the results of our individual level analyses by party voted for in 2010. 
Our analyses are cross-sectional, having selected voters who were undecided in terms of 
vote choice prior to the campaign.  This is so we can isolate the effect of the campaign on 
those who had not already made up their mind. We use binary logistic regression with the 
dependent variable being coded as a vote for a particular party or not (i.e. Vote Conservative 
1, Not Vote Conservative 0). We fit three models each with additional control variables. 
Model 1 examines the impact of the campaigns on undecided voters without any controls. 
Model 2 controls for previous vote for the party that the respondent ultimately chose. 
Including previous vote as a control helps remove any possible effects of endogeneity similar 
to including previous vote share in the constituency level analyses. This effectively controls 
for the possibility that parties send more campaign material to people who have supported 
the party previously (measured by previous vote).  
 
In order to further test the robustness of our results, we estimate with a third model (Model 
3), which includes the additional controls of which party was deemed to have the best 
policies to solve the respondent’s assessment of the most important problem (MiP) facing 
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the country; Clarke et al, (2004, 2009, 2011) show how this assessment has been a critical 
determinant of voting behaviour in the last three elections. These are, therefore useful 
further control variables to confirm the impact of our variables of interest – the campaigns. Of 
course issue performance is itself likely to be influenced by the campaign, so the inclusion of 
these as independent variables may lead to an underestimation of the campaign’s effects. 
However it is useful to run the models with the additional controls to provide a lower bound 
on the campaign effects7. What is clear from the results in Model 3, however, is that despite 
the additions of these controls, the results in respect of the campaign effects remain 
unchanged  
 
Some important patterns are apparent in the analyses. First, Labour campaigning exerted a 
statistically significant positive impact on the Labour vote amongst undecided voters, and a 
negative impact on votes for other parties in all three models. For example,  using the results 
from Model 2,8 a previously undecided voter who had voted Labour in 2005 and had 
received three types of Labour campaign material and only one from the other two main 
parties, had a 0.63 probability (or 63% chance) of voting Labour (see Figure 6). This 
compares with only a probability of 0.29 for an otherwise identical voter receiving no Labour 
campaign material (and one from the other major parties). The equivalent percentages for 
undecided electors who had not voted Labour previously were 24% and 7% respectively. In 
relative terms the differential between those receiving material and those not was greater for 
Labour than the other parties (although in absolute terms the Liberal Democrat campaign 
attracted more new undecided voters). Equally, undecided voters were significantly less 
likely to ultimately vote Conservative after receiving more Labour contacts, even if they had 
voted Conservative in 2005. 
 
The same patterns are also true for the Liberal Democrats. As can be seen in Figure 6, the 
Liberal Democrats were ultimately the most voted for party amongst undecided respondents, 
Moreover, campaign contacts significantly boosted the chances of voting Liberal Democrat 
while reducing the chances of voting for other parties amongst previously undecided voters. 
For example, the model predicts 84% of undecided voters who had voted Liberal Democrat 
previously and had received three types of Liberal Democrat campaign material (and one 
                                               
7
  We ran a further model including evaluations of the three main party leaders following Clarke et al’s (2004, 2009, 
2011) demonstration of the importance of leadership effects on vote choice. Due to a large number of missing values, 
this resulted in an unacceptable loss of 173 cases. We include the model in the Appendix (see Table A1), 
nevertheless, for information. The results are broadly unchanged, except for the fact that the negative impact of 
Conservative campaigning of the Labour vote, and Labour campaigning on the Conservative vote are now non-
significant. However, our view is that these changes can be explained by the fact that evaluations of leaders are 
themselves influenced by the campaign (see, for example, Stevens, Karp & Hodgson, 2011). Campaigning will, by its 
very nature, seek to influence leadership evaluations (especially in a campaign so dominated by leaders – see Pattie 
& Johnston, 2011; Stevens, Karp & Hodgson, 2011). 
8
  Model 2 is preferred for the estimation of predicted values due to the possible endogeneity of issue performance. 
However, using model 2 or model 3 makes very little difference to the size of the effects. 
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from the other major parties) would vote Liberal Democrat compared with 59% for a similar 
voter receiving no Liberal Democrat campaign material. For the Conservatives, however, the 
results are a little less strong. On the one hand, a higher level of Conservative contact had 
the effect of both boosting the chances of voting Conservative and lessening the chance of 
voting Labour amongst previously undecided voters. Greater exposure to Conservative 
campaigns (defined in the same way) led a predicted 71% of undecided Conservatives to 
vote for the party again in 2010 compared to 52% who were not subject to any campaign 
contact. Similarly the Conservative campaign reduced the chance of undecided voters 
choosing Labour. However, Conservative campaign contacts had no impact on Liberal 
Democrat support. In all three models, the impact of Conservative contacts on Liberal 
Democrat voting was non-significant. 
 
Table 5. The Impact of Campaign Contacts on Previously Undecided Voters (Conservative Vote) 
 
n=3221 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B  B  B  
Con Campaign .391 (.067) .274 (.073) .297 (.083) 
Lab Campaign -.302 (.080) -.238 (.087) -.241 (.096) 
Lib Dem Campaign -.271 (.082) -.209 (.088) -.223 (.097) 
Con Vote 2005 n/a  2.130 (.108) 1.752 (.119) 
Con MiP n/a  n/a  1.720 (.123) 
Lab MiP n/a  n/a  -1.443 (.218) 
Lib Dem MiP n/a  n/a  -1.333 (.198) 
Constant -1.167 (.054) -1.597 (.063) -1.572 (.075) 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .021  .198  .351  
-2 Log likelihood 3456.694  3047.826  2649.407  
 
Note1 : Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: n/a Not Applicable 
Note 3: MiP Most Important Problem 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Campaign Contacts on Previously Undecided Voters (Labour Vote) 
 
n=3221 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B  B  B  
Con Campaign -.272 (.077) -.231 (.082) -.199 (.086) 
Lab Campaign .563 (.073) .471 (.079) .462 (.082) 
Lib Dem Campaign -.491 (.091) -.392 (.095) -.451 (.102) 
Lab Vote 2005 n/a  1.655 (.091) 1.430 (.096) 
Con MiP n/a  n/a  -1.143 (.205) 
Lab MiP n/a  n/a  1.284 (.116) 
Lib Dem MiP n/a  n/a  -.835 (.171) 
Constant -1.190 (.054) -1.920 (.076) -1.875 (.085) 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .039  .190  .286  
-2 Log likelihood 3360.551  3013.008  2772.558  
 
Note1 : Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Note 3: n/a Not Applicable 
Note 3: MiP Most Important Problem 
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Table 7. The Impact of Campaign Contacts on Previously Undecided Voters (Liberal Democrat Vote) 
 
n=3221 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B  B  B  
Con Campaign n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  
Lab Campaign -.264 (.067) -.235 (.069) -.257 (.074) 
Lib Dem Campaign .546 (.069) .450 (.071) .471 (.077) 
Lib Dem Vote 2005 n/a  1.290 (.098) 1.209 (.104) 
Con MiP n/a  n/a  -.926 (.133) 
Lab MiP n/a  n/a  n.s.  
Lib Dem MiP n/a  n/a  1.845 (.130) 
Constant -.466 (.047) -.685 (.051) -.779 (.061) 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .032  .104  .237  
-2 Log likelihood 4284.974  4102.234  3739.410  
 
Note1 : Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Note 2:  n.s. Not Statistically Significant 
Note 3: n/a Not Applicable 
Note 4:  MiP Most Important Problem 
 
Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of undecided respondents voting for a party by receipt of number of 
types of campaign material from that party, and previous support. 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In the 2010 general election, parties faced an uncertain electoral context. With Labour 
relatively unpopular, the potential was there for the Liberal Democrats to make further gains, 
provided that they could target their resources effectively, while resisting the resurgence of 
the Conservative Party. The picture for the Conservatives was mixed. The electoral 
momentum was with the party, but the arithmetic of gaining sufficient seats to win a majority 
was against them. For Labour, the picture was almost universally bad. Not only was the 
government unpopular, but their principal opponents were much stronger than five years 
previously, and through necessity the party was forced to target a large number of seats. 
Winning the election overall was unlikely, so minimizing losses was the focus. 
 
Previous supporter, 3 types
Previous supporter, no types
Not previous supporter, 3 types
Not previous supporter, no types
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The outcomes in terms of the electoral payoffs from campaigning were mixed, but perhaps 
unexpected. The results for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were generally 
positive, but not as positive as they might have been given the electoral context. In both 
cases, a plausible explanation is that there were too many targeted seats for the electoral 
payoffs to be as high as one might have expected. In the case of the Conservatives, this was 
understandable. An outright victory was possible, but only if the party gained at least 116 
seats. Thus, the targeting of a large number of seats was a necessity given the results of the 
2005 election. With the benefit of hindsight, less attention could, perhaps, have been paid to 
the party’s ‘certainties’ – the very marginal seats that were likely to fall to the Conservatives 
anyway. As Figure 3 shows, relatively less intense campaigning occurred in these seats 
compared with the ‘core targets’ but given the marginality of these seats, more intense 
campaigning in the ‘possibles’ (which was of slightly lower intensity compared with the 
‘certainties’) would probably have yielded stronger electoral payoffs. Of course, campaign 
planners would probably not have wanted to risk such a strategy. In any case, whether this 
effort could have been re-directed elsewhere is not clear. Indeed, for all parties, there is little 
benefit from campaigning less where the benefits are uncertain and resources are relatively 
immobile.  
 
The Liberal Democrats, however, were probably both over ambitious and at the same time 
over cautious. In terms of ambition, the party possibly over-extended itself in terms of 
offensive targets. Previous elections have seen more modest targets in terms of gains 
reflecting the party’s lower level of resource compared with the Conservatives and Labour. 
More problematic, however, was the defensive strategy in terms of existing Liberal Democrat 
seats, where as Figure 5 shows, there was virtually an identical level of intensity compared 
with the party’s offensive targets. With the benefit of hindsight, much activity was expended 
unnecessarily, though the same caveats concerning mobility of resources apply here as to 
the Conservatives. In sum, while the Liberal Democrats were – as usual – very successful in 
differentiating campaign efforts between target and non-target seats, but like the 
Conservatives, it appears that their choice of targets was sub-optimal. 
 
This becomes more apparent when we compare their results with those of Labour, whose 
campaigning was successful against the odds suggested by the electoral context. To help 
explain this, one might point to the relatively sophisticated way in which Labour target seats 
were designated (Fisher et al, 2011). Labour’s targeting decisions were derived from 
propensity modelling. This technique applied four criteria: the level of activity in the local 
party, the electoral performance in various elections since 2005, the notional majority, and 
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the existence of any particular political circumstances (such as hospital closures or 
expenses). All criteria were given a score with the model then predicting the result. The 
outcome was that Labour seemingly selected the most appropriate targets and had realistic 
assumptions about the result. Labour’s strategy was to minimize its losses and deny the 
Conservatives a majority. The evidence here suggests that the party’s constituency level 
campaigning was one contributory factor in its success. All of this tallies with previous work 
that has suggested that good central management of campaigns is as important - if not more 
important - than the level of raw resources on the ground (Fisher et al, 2006a).  
 
These findings, then, are of some significance. In the first instance, they help explain why 
Labour was successful in denying the Conservative a majority despite securing its lowest 
post-war vote share save for that of 1983. Our model of campaign effectiveness (see Table 
1) predicted correctly that the Conservative and Liberal Democrat campaigns would be more 
likely to be successful on account of closeness of the election and the likelihood of 
significant change. It also helps explain why the Conservatives may have been less 
successful due to problems of coordinating the necessarily large number of target seats. But 
on the face of it, it failed to explain why Labour’s campaigns were relatively successful. To 
varying degrees, all of the variables in the model suggested that Labour’s campaigns should 
have been less effective – Labour’s unpopularity should have offset the impact of the 
closeness of the election and to a degree, the impact of the Conservatives’ need to target so 
many seats. Equally, Labour’s status as incumbent in an election where significant change 
was likely should have been to its disadvantage.  
 
However, the findings suggest strong campaign management can help overcome such 
conditions to a degree. They emphasise that good campaign management really matters, 
and good management is about realism in respect of what a party can achieve. Thus, set 
against a group of very unfavourable variables, Labour was able to achieve its realistic 
objective of denying the Conservatives a majority. Compare this with the Conservative’s 
strategy in 2001 of targeting 180 seats following the results of the 1997 election (Denver et 
al, 2002b). A better strategy then might well have been to focus on fewer seats to try and 
reduce Labour’s majority. Good campaign management can then temper the effects of 
exogenous factors as much as less good campaign management can reduce their 
advantage. As such, in the light of these findings, our model as featured in Table 1 can be 
re-formulated (see Table 8). 
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Table 8. New exogenous factors influencing likely effectiveness of constituency campaigns 
   
 More Effective Less Effective 
Closeness of Election Popularity Equilibrium Unpopular party(ies) 
Significant change likely Challenger(s)   Incumbent  
High No’s of Target seats Unpopular party(ies) Popularity Equilibrium 
Central Management Clear objectives Unclear objectives 
 
So, management matters in predicting campaign success, but politics matters, too. Labour 
was conspicuously successful in recruiting undecided voters through its campaign efforts, 
which given Labour’s difficulties in its third term points to a failing of both other parties (but 
particularly the Conservatives) to ‘seal the deal’ with the electorate. When Labour won in 
1997, the party and its leader were both very popular in absolute terms. In 2010, Labour was 
unpopular, and the Conservatives were only popular in terms relative to Labour (Clarke et 
al., 2011: 252). In this context, Labour’s campaigns were less likely to suffer from a tide of 
resignation and were more likely to be galvanised, both by the prospect of a Conservative 
victory and by the possibility in the short campaign that Labour could end up third in terms of 
vote share following the rapid improvement in Liberal Democrat poll ratings. Such successes 
were aided by very effective targeting. Labour, of course, lost the 2010 election, but the 
result of the constituency campaigns and their impact on the final outcome arguably points 
paradoxically to a form of ‘triumph’ for Labour against the odds. 
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Appendix 
 
Responses 
The numbers of responses for each party by target status were as follows: 
 
 All Held Not Target Target No Target Not Held 
Conservative 287 120 56 111 
Labour 388 129 74 185 
Liberal Democrat 353 * 50 303 
 
Mean Percentage of Maximum Spend by Responses During Long and Short 
Campaigns 
 
% Respondents All Constiuencies 
Conservative 37.2 38.1 
Labour 22.5 25.6 
Liberal Democrat 18.8 19.6 
SNP 17.0 16.3 
Plaid Cymru 13.9 15.7 
 
Calculation of Campaign Intensity Index 
Responses to the questions below are grouped through additive scales into the following 
core components of constituency campaigning: Preparation, Organisation, Manpower, 
Computers, Polling Day Activity, Telephones, Direct Mail, Canvassing, Leaflets and E-
Campaigning. These groups are then entered into a PCA, which produced the solution 
overleaf. 
 
Group Question 
 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - JOBS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - CAMPAIGN FUNDS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - MAIN COMMITTEE ROOMS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - LOCAL COMMITTEE ROOMS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - ELECTORAL REGISTER 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - ELECTION ADDRESS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - PRINTING 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - IDENTIFYING SUPPORTERS 
Preparation STARTED SERIOUS PLANNING 
Preparation USE OF PREVIOUS CANVASS RECORDS 
Organization % OF CONST COVERED BY ACTIVE LOCAL ORGS 
Organization HOW LONG AGO KNEW RESPONSIBLE 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - CANVASSING ORGANISER 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - POSTAL VOTES 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - CANDIDATE AIDE 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - COMPUTER OFFICER 
Organization LOCAL ORGAINSERS OR SUB-AGENTS 
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN WORKERS 
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY 
Computers DELEGATED DUTIES - COMPUTER OFFICER 
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS - DIRECT MAIL 
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS - CANVASS RETURNS 
Computers USE COMPUTERISED ELECTORAL REGISTER 
Computers COMPUTERS USED TO COMPILE KNOCK-UP LISTS 
Computers ELECTION SOFTWARE PROVIDED BY PARTY HQ 
Polling Day Activity GOOD MORNING LEAFLETS DELIVERED 
Polling Day Activity VOTERS KNOCKED UP ON POLLING DAY 
Polling Day Activity % OF CONSTITUENCY COVERED 
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Polling Day Activity NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY 
Polling Day Activity VOLUNTEERS SENT INTO YOUR CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING IN CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones OUTSIDE CANVASSING 
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING 
Telephones TELEPHONE CANVASSING ORGANISED FROM OUTSIDE 
CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones VOTERS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE ON POLLING DAY 
Direct Mail LEAFLETS TARGETED AT PARTICULAR GROUPS 
Direct Mail DIRECT MAIL USED TO TARGET INDIVIDUAL VOTERS 
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE CANVASSED 
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE TELEPHONE CANVASSED? 
Leaflets HOW MANY REGIONALLY/NATIONALLY PRODUCED LEAFLETS 
DISTRIBUTED 
Leaflets TOTAL NUMBER OF LOCALLY PRODUCED LEAFLETS 
E-Campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - OPERATING AND MAINTAINING A 
WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - USING SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
E-Campaigning CONTACT VOTERS IN THE CONSTITUENCY BY TEXT MESSAGE 
E-Campaigning MAKE USE OF TWITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH VOTERS 
E-Campaigning USE OF COMPUTERS - EMAILING VOTERS 
E-Campaigning LOCAL PARTY & CANDIDATE WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - MAINTAINING WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - EMAILING VOTERS 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES  
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - VIDEO/IMAGE SHARING SITES  
E-Campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY TEXT ON POLLING DAY 
E-Campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY EMAIL ON POLLING DAY 
 
 
Principal Components Analysis of Campaign Components 
  
  
  Component 
  1 
PREPARATION .816 
ORGANISATION .775 
MANPOWER .641 
COMPUTERS .507 
POLLING DAY ACTIVITY .824 
TELEPHONES .765 
DIRECT MAIL .740 
CANVASSING .719 
LEAFLETS .438 
E-CAMPAIGNING .475 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a 1 components extracted. 
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Table A1. The Impact of Campaign Contacts on Previously Undecided Voters (with leadership 
evaluations) 
 
n=3048 Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
 B  B  B  
Con Campaign .298 (.090) n.s.  n.s.  
Lab Campaign n.s.  .401 (.088) -.311 (.078) 
Lib Dem Campaign -.366 (.106) -.418 (.109) .471 (.081) 
Con Vote 2005 1.277 (.131) n/a  n/a  
Lab Vote 2005 n/a  1.229 (.104) n/a  
Lib Dem Vote 2005 n/a  n/a  1.194 (.110) 
Con MiP 1.016 (.140) -.604 (.226) -.612 (.146) 
Lab MiP -.655 (.242) .629 (.129) -.374 (.127) 
Lib Dem MiP -1.032 (.219) -.797 (.186) 1.410 (.137) 
Gordon Brown Evaluation -.171 (.024) .317 (.024) n.s.  
David Cameron Evaluation .393 (.029) -.123 (.022) -.146 (.018) 
Nick Clegg Evaluation -.167 (.027) -.18 (.025) .258 (.022) 
Constant -1.939 (.201) -1.927 (.192) -1.604 (.163) 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .482  .386  .311  
-2 Log likelihood 2124.849  2363.018  3337.355  
 
Note1 : Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Note 2:  n.s. Not Statistically Significant 
Note 3: n/a Not Applicable 
Note 4:  MiP Most Important Problem 
 
